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ABSTRACT. “Economic refugees” largely remain outside the international protection 
regimes of refugee and human rights law.1 Nevertheless, recent case law of the Euro- 
pean Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) opens up limited possibilities for economic 
refugees to rely on Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), 
which prohibits torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. The 
present paper asks: can, and if so, under what circumstances does, the deportation to 
situations of economic, social and cultural rights (ESCR) violations caused by 
conditions of extreme poverty form a violation of the non-refoulement principle? 
The present study conducts a doctrinal legal analysis of the most remarkable cases of 
the ECtHR in that respect. The delimitation and use of the concepts of exceptional 
circumstances and vulnerability are especially intriguing in this regard and are the 
main focus of this paper. Most ground-breaking was the case of MSS v Belgium and 
Greece in which the ECtHR recognized the living conditions of “most extreme 
poverty” of the applicant in Greece as falling within the scope of Article 3 ECHR. 
With the subsequent cases of Sufi and Elmi v UK, SHH v UK and Tarakhel v 
Switzerland, the innovative character of MSS v Belgium and Greece has been 
challenged, redefined and put into perspective. It can be concluded that the ECtHR 
has increasingly recognized vulnerability as a relevant criterion to be applied in 
addition to, or possibly even as a substitute for, the previously applied exceptional 
circumstances standard. The burden of proof for vulnerability seems to be lower 
than for the exceptional circumstances threshold and more attention seems to be paid 
to the general environment and situation in the country of origin rather than only to 
the individual circumstances of the applicant.  
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“He allegedly spent months living in a state of the most extreme poverty, unable to 
cater for his most basic needs: food, hygiene and a place to live. […] Such living 
conditions […] have attained the level of severity required to fall within the scope 
of Article 3 of the Convention.” 
–MSS v Belgium and Greece paragraphs 254 and 2632  
 
As the above quote from the 2011 MSS v Belgium and Greece case suggests, 
the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) seems increasingly inclined to 
consider economic, social and cultural rights (economic, social and cultural 
rights) violations under Article 3 of the European Convention of Human 
Rights (ECHR), which prohibits torture and inhuman or degrading treatment 
or punishment.3 The present paper therefore asks: can, and if so, under what 
circumstances does, the deportation to situations of economic, social and 
cultural rights violations caused by conditions of extreme poverty form a 
violation of the non-refoulement principle?4 
The research rests on the 1993 Vienna Declaration and Programme of 
Action’s statement that all human rights are “universal, indivisible and inter- 
dependent and interrelated.”5 This leaves room for a connection of extreme 
poverty, as encompassed in economic, social and cultural rights, with the 
prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment, a right with a 
civil and political connotation. In order to approach the topic from a legal 
perspective, extreme poverty is understood as a general concept along the 
lines of the economic, social and cultural rights it violates. As is stated in the 
Human Rights Council’s Final Draft of the Guiding Principles on Extreme 
Poverty and Human Rights, “[p]overty is not solely an economic issue, but 
rather a multidimensional phenomenon that encompasses a lack of both 
income and the basic capabilities to live in dignity” and as such has to be 
considered in a more holistic manner.6 The economic, social and cultural 
rights dealt with in the context of economic refugees in this study are thus 
considered in general rather than as individual economic, social and cultural 
rights.7  
The principle of non-refoulement of Article 33 of the Convention Relating 
to the Status of Refugees (CRSR) may offer a possible argument for additional 
protection requirements.8 Non-refoulement is paradoxical since it is explicitly 
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stated in the CRSR but its content remains undefined under international 
law.9 As a result, international, regional and national bodies have wide 
discretion in clarifying its meaning.10  
Previous research has discussed and refined the scope of the principle of 
non-refoulement.11 However, the exact meaning for persons fleeing from 
extreme poverty remains disputed. This is particularly problematic in light of 
the current public debate surrounding the deservingness of protection: is 
someone only entitled to protection if fleeing for reasons recognized by the 
traditional refugee protection regime of Article 1(A)2 CRSR or subsidiary 
protection regimes such as Article 15 of the EU Qualifications Directive?12 
Or is there also a legal responsibility to not return those leaving their home 
country for other reasons, particularly if they are or will be in a vulnerable 
situation upon return?  
The subsequent study focuses on the interpretation of the scope of the 
principle of non-refoulement in the context of the ECHR. This is especially 
valuable since it is within the Council of Europe that the interpretation of the 
concept has developed furthest due to the ECtHR’s case law.13 Moreover, 
previous research reveals that the concept of vulnerability is an increasingly 
important balancing tool for the ECtHR with regard to discrimination issues.14 
The present study therefore investigates the extent to which this is also the 
case with regard to the principle of non-refoulement. 
In Airey v UK the ECtHR expressed the opinion that the civil and 
political rights entailed in the ECHR have social and economic implications. 
Consequently, even where a situation extends to economic, social and cul- 
tural rights violations, it can still be considered under the ECHR.15 Although 
itself not directly related to non-refoulement, Airey v UK forms the basis for 
any possible claims by economic refugees to rely on Article 3 ECHR. Several 
subsequent cases are of particular significance for defining the scope of non-
refoulement through establishing two thresholds of inhuman or degrading 
treatment under Article 3 ECHR, namely the requirement of exceptional cir- 
cumstances and the question of vulnerability. Both concepts are analyzed and 
compared in detail below by referring to the relevant case law on refoulement 
to situations of economic, social and cultural rights violations.  
The analysis is based on the presumption that, although the ECtHR has 
taken a very strict view on allowing invocations of Article 3 ECHR on the 
basis of economic, social and cultural rights violations in the past, there has 
been a gradual opening to this idea. While previously relying on the excep- 
tional circumstances approach, there seems to be a slow movement beyond 
that concept and towards vulnerability. The paper does not discuss the clari- 
fication or desirability of this move but tries to deduct what each approach 
has to offer for non-refoulement protection in situations of economic, social 
and cultural rights violations.  
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The research methods are primarily doctrinal and positivistic. As such, 
the study includes an analysis of the ECHR and case law of the ECtHR in 
order to clarify and increase the coherence of the non-refoulement principle 
as embedded within the larger international legal system.16 The research 
analyzes the ECtHR’s approach towards economic, social and cultural rights 
violation claims under Article 3 ECHR through noting gaps, inconsistencies, 
ambiguities and possibilities in the ECtHR’s approach with the aim of estab- 
lishing the current state of the law and its possible future developments. 
First, the study provides a short overview of the threshold for relying on 
the non-refoulement principle of Article 3 ECHR more generally through 
identifying the severity of treatment and the real risk involved as the two 
decisive factors. The second part of this study examines this threshold in the 
ECtHR’s case law directly related to economic refugees and refoulement in 
light of the concepts of exceptional circumstances and vulnerability before 
concluding on the prospects for the non-refoulement protection of economic 
refugees. 
 
2. The Scope of Non-refoulement under Article 3 ECHR 
 
Article 3 ECHR holds that “[n]o one shall be subjected to torture or to 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment”. Although this article does 
not explicitly refer to non-refoulement, the ECtHR has, ever since Soering v 
UK, consistently interpreted the principle to be implied in the article.17 As 
such, a large number of cases has dealt with the question of non-refoulement 
and the provision is nowadays unquestioningly established as one of the 
strongest protection mechanisms in the Council of Europe area.18 Article 3 
ECHR is absolute and states cannot rely on any justification for violating the 
principle of non-refoulement.19 When analyzing the ECtHR’s case law, it 
becomes evident that two aspects are relevant for determining the scope of 
non-refoulement under Article 3 ECHR: i) the severity of suffering as part of 
the actual treatment inflicted and ii) the real risk that this treatment would be 
inflicted if the person was deported. 
 
The severity of suffering involved 
As the ECtHR held in Ireland v UK, there exists a “minimum level of 
severity” threshold for Article 3 ECHR. Accordingly, the ECtHR held that 
treatment which has been or will be inflicted must be evaluated relatively 
and depending “on all the circumstances of the case, such as the duration of 
the treatment, its physical or mental effects and, in some cases, the sex, age 
and state of health of the person concerned.”20 Regarding the degradingness 
of a certain treatment, the ECtHR emphasized that there must be a certain 
degree of humiliation which needs to be established separately for each case.21 
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According to Peers v Greece, the ill-treatment must cause “feelings of anguish 
and inferiority capable of humiliating and debasing him.”22 The humiliating 
effect is thus most relevant for the establishment of the severity of the 
degrading treatment but, regardless of any publicity, a treatment might also 
be degrading if the applicant himself feels that he has been humiliated. In 
turn, inhuman treatment – while in most cases also being degrading – is 
primarily based on the physical integrity of a person and the bodily harm 
inflicted.23 Moreover, according to the cases of Tyrer v UK and Costello-
Roberts v UK, also the publicity involved is a relevant criterion.24 Generally, 
it can thus be assumed that the threshold for inhuman treatment is higher 
than for degrading treatment but in both cases it is the severity of suffering 
that matters most. However, the severity of suffering threshold does not 
entail any clarification for when someone may or may not be returned under 
the non-refoulement principle. It is for this reason that it is necessary to take 
an additional criterion into account: the real risk threshold. 
 
Substantial ground for believing the real risk 
With regard to the determination of non-refoulement in relation to inhuman 
or degrading treatment, the real risk involved is of additional relevance in 
order to determine whether a state would violate its obligations under Article 
3 ECHR by returning someone to his or her country of origin. In the ECtHR’s 
case law, a temporal and a personal scope have been identified as the rele- 
vant criteria for the real risk assessment. According to Soering v UK, Article 
3 ECHR requires “substantial grounds for believing” that the person con- 
cerned faces “a real risk of exposure to inhuman or degrading treatment.”25 
In Saadi v Italy and later in N v UK, the ECtHR clarified that the criterion 
which is especially relevant is the real risk involved.26  
With regard to the temporal scope, the ECtHR held in Chahal v UK that 
the real risk must be assessed in a “rigorous” manner and, as such, “it is the 
present conditions which are decisive”.27 This has been interpreted in Jabari 
v Turkey to mean that a “meaningful assessment of the applicant’s claim” is 
necessary and that changed circumstances must be taken into account.28 How- 
ever, in Salah Sheekh v the Netherlands there was no need to establish past 
persecution, but the ECHR was interpreted to require a future-oriented risk for 
which past persecution may only be suggestive but not necessarily conclusive.29 
In addition to the temporal scope, the ECtHR established in Vilvarajah 
and Others v UK that, while general human rights violations of a massive 
scale in the respective country may be indicative of a real risk, they may not 
be conclusive for granting protection under Article 3 ECHR.30 Accordingly, 
the real risk assessment should be based on general and personal circum- 
stances.31 There is a need to show that one would be in a worse position than 
“the generality of” people in a similar situation.32 Furthermore, the “mere 
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possibility of ill-treatment” does not suffice to claim protection under Article 
3 ECHR.33 Yet, in Salah Sheekh v the Netherlands the ECtHR applied a more 
group-oriented approach where, in order to establish a real risk, the applicant 
cannot be asked to prove that he has “special distinguishing features” other 
than being the member of a minority group.34 The “mere possibility of ill-
treatment” was considered to be sufficient to grant Article 3 ECHR protection.35  
It becomes apparent that the ECtHR’s approach has gradually been 
evolving and has not yet reached its limits of interpretation. The scope of 
Article 3 ECHR has been interpreted in an open-ended manner with much of 
its substance being decided on a case by case basis. Similarly, previous 
authors suggest that the threshold that needs to be met to qualify as inhuman 
or degrading treatment is relative.36 It is therefore necessary to examine the 
case law directly related to economic refugees in order to clarify the legal 
obligations of the state under Article 3 ECHR for the return to situations of 
economic, social and cultural rights violations. As is revealed below, it is the 
exceptional circumstances and the vulnerability of the applicant involved that 
play a distinguishing role in cases of refoulement to situations of economic, 
social and cultural rights violations. The ECtHR has used both concepts as a 
justification for cases to meet or not meet the relevant threshold of severity 
of suffering and substantial grounds for believing the real risk involved. 
 
3. Exceptional Circumstances and Vulnerability in the ECtHR’s Case Law 
 
Vulnerability is a widely discussed concept in the academic field.37 Never- 
theless, its content remains largely unclear and it goes beyond the scope of 
this paper to discuss its meaning in more detail. For the present analysis, 
both the term vulnerability and the concept of exceptional circumstances are 
used purely in the context of the ECtHR’s case law regarding the severity of 
suffering and the substantial grounds for believing the real risk of refoule- 
ment. Their meanings are left undefined where the ECtHR itself does not 
offer additional information. Since the ECtHR seems to be increasingly 
shifting from the exceptional circumstances criterion towards vulnerability, 
the following part starts with discussing the cases relevant for exceptional 
circumstances before analyzing the cases on vulnerability.  
 
The decisiveness of exceptional circumstances  
One of the essential cases on the exceptional circumstances criterion is the 
case of D v The United Kingdom (UK). The case dealt with an AIDS-suffering 
drug trafficker from the St. Kitts island who was to be deported to St. Kitts 
by the UK governement.38 
With regard to the severity of suffering involved, the ECtHR established 
that the deportation of the applicant would mean that he would have to die 
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“under most distressing circumstances”.39  This would amount to a violation 
of Article 3 ECHR despite the fact that the conditions in the country of 
origin were not in themselves conflicting with the refoulement prohibition.40 
With regard to the severity of suffering involved, the ECtHR emphasized the 
extraordinary “humanitarian considerations” at stake and found that the return 
would therefore amount to inhuman treatment.41 Moreover, the ECtHR found 
that due to the “exceptional circumstances” and “the critical stage” of the 
illness, the applicant could be considered to face the real risk of being sub- 
jected to “inhuman treatment” contrary to Article 3 ECHR if he was to be 
returned to St. Kitts.42  
Hence, the exceptional circumstances were decisive for both the severity 
of suffering and for the substantial grounds for believing a real risk of 
inhuman treatment. However, according to Arai-Takahashi, this does not 
mean that circumstances of economic, social and cultural rights violations 
can generally be sources of a real risk within the meaning of Article 3 ECHR 
and that the real risk of the applicant being exposed to “the most dramatic 
consequences” upon removal was clearly existent. Rather, it shows that it 
were the personal circumstances of suffering from a fatal disease in its 
terminal stage and not the lower standard of health care available in St. Kitts 
which were decisive for the ECtHR.43 Nevertheless, Stoyanova remarks that 
the case promotes the principle of non-refoulement to include instances 
where there is, similarly to situations of economic, social and cultural rights 
violations, no deliberate infliction of ill-treatment. Hence, it furthers the idea 
that even the country of origin’s failure to sustain the basic human needs of 
its people can be sufficient to establish a violation of Article 3 ECHR.44  
It can be argued that the application possibilities Article 3 ECHR are both 
broadened and limited due to the ECtHR’s emphasis on the exceptional 
circumstances criterion in D v UK. It even seems like the ECtHR had already 
detected a particular vulnerability of the applicant but – consciously or un- 
consciously – chose not to use that term. However, the ruling in favor of a 
person with a medical condition under the non-refoulement principle remains 
exceptional. Subsequent cases have shown that claiming protection on the 
basis of a similarity with D v UK is difficult. The restrictive view of the 
ECtHR has, for instance, been confirmed in the European Commission of 
Human Rights case Karara v Finland and the ECtHR case SCC v Sweden 
which were considered to be inadmissible because they did not meet the 
required severity and real risk threshold.45  
Another case dealing extensively with the exceptional circumstances 
threshold was the ECtHR case Bensaid v UK. In this case, the ECtHR dealt 
with a person suffering from schizophrenia who was supposed to be returned 
to Algeria despite the limited treatment possibilities in Algeria and the 
severity of symptoms such as hallucinations.46 The ECtHR concluded that 
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the return of the applicant would not be a violation of Article 3 ECHR.47 The 
fact that the conditions in Algeria were less favorable than in the UK was not 
considered to be decisive and did not meet the threshold of “exceptional 
circumstances” as in D v UK.48 the ECtHR did not find a real risk for Article 
3 ECHR to be violated but rather established a “high threshold” and the re- 
quirement of a “sufficiently real risk” for situations where the circumstances 
are not directly caused by the country of origin.49 The case was therefore dis- 
tinguished from D v UK on the grounds that the risk of exposing the applicant 
to a situation contrary to Article 3 ECHR was only “speculative” rather than 
“sufficiently real.”50 
The case of Bensaid v UK clearly highlights the limited application 
possibilities of D v UK and the absolute necessity of an “exceptional” nature 
of the case in order to be granted Article 3 ECHR protection for economic, 
social and cultural rights violations.51 The door which had been opened in D 
v UK for economic refugees to possibly rely on Article 3 ECHR in situations 
of economic, social and cultural rights violations in the country of origin was 
closed again by a very strict application of the threshold of exceptionality in 
cases such as Bensaid v UK. The ECtHR confirmed its restrictive approach 
in subsequent cases such as Arcila Henao v the Netherlands, Ndangoya v 
Sweden, Amegnigan v the Netherlands and, most significantly, in N v UK.52 
In N v UK the Ugandan applicant suffered from AIDS in a less severe 
stadium than the applicant in D v UK.53 In a what seems to be very strict 
interpretation of the ECtHR, the ECHR maintained that medical treatment, 
as an economic, social and cultural rights, did not fall within Article 3 ECHR 
and states were hence not required to provide medical treatment under the 
ECHR.54 The applicant, the ECtHR concluded, was not “at the present time 
critically ill” and future conditions would be mere speculations, which is 
why no exceptional circumstances could be found.55 While previous cases 
allowed for some leeway with regard to the interpretation of exceptional 
circumstances, the case of N v UK clearly establishes a tremendously high 
threshold for Article 3 ECHR and maintains that there are no economic, 
social and cultural rights obligations for Council of Europe member states 
entailed in the ECHR. Based on this case, there seem to be little prospects 
for economic refugees to claim non-refoulement protection. The ruling in N v 
UK is still met with fierce criticism, even from judges of the ECtHR, as being 
too stringent and incorrect in light the object and purpose of the ECHR.56  
Judging from the three above discussed cases D v UK, Bensaid v UK and 
N v UK, the prospects for economic refugees to rely on Article 3 ECHR on 
the basis of the right to health, let alone any other economic, social and 
cultural rights, seemed dim in the past. As Stoyanova rightly observes, all of 
the above cases merely dealt with “naturally occurring illness” rather than 
direct violations of economic, social and cultural rights through the acts or 
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omissions by states or non-state entities.57 Due to the fact that extreme poverty 
is, in most cases, no personal but a more general condition, the real risk 
threshold of exceptional circumstances appears to be impossible to reach for 
any applicant. However, the case of MSS v Belgium and Greece provides a 
remarkable reinterpretation of non-refoulment in the light of vulnerability 
which may provide a possible opening for economic refugees to rely on 
Article 3 ECHR. 
 
Towards a vulnerability criterion 
MSS was an asylum-seeker from Afghanistan who entered the EU through 
Greece and moved on to Belgium after having been registered in the Eurodac 
system.58 When Belgium wanted to return him to Greece on the basis of the 
EU’s Dublin II Regulation (Regulation 2003/343/EC),59 MSS filed a request 
for interim measures under Rule 39 of the ECtHR’s Rules of Court, which 
was rejected.60 MSS was consequently removed to Greece where he was 
subjected to degrading treatment in the form of conditions of “most extreme 
poverty” which gave rise to a violation of Article 3 ECHR.61 Taking account 
of the ECtHR’s statement in the previous case of KRS v UK to directly com- 
plain against Greece rather than against the refouling state, MSS consequently 
lodged a complaint against both, Belgium and Greece, on the basis of Article 
2, 3 and 13 ECHR.62  
In this case, the ECtHR clearly established for the first time that certain 
living conditions can amount to inhuman or degrading treatment in the con- 
text of Article 3 ECHR.63 The ECtHR unanimously considered the detention 
conditions of asylum-seekers in Greece to violate Article 3 ECHR.64 More- 
over, the ECtHR considered the applicant’s situation to be especially severe 
since, according to his own portrayal, he had lived on the streets for several 
months, having to search food and without access to sanitation.65 
The ECtHR again established in MSS v Belgium and Greece that a certain 
level of severity needed to be met in all cases.66 It distinguished and defined 
inhuman as compared to degrading treatment and came to the conclusion 
that the conditions MSS had been exposed to were of a “humiliating” nature 
within the meaning of Article 3 ECHR.67 This is generally in line with the 
ECtHR’s judgment in, among other cases, Tyrer v UK where it was held that 
for each individual case a certain degree of humiliation needed to be met.68 
In MSS v Belgium and Greece, the ECtHR employed a more liberal 
severity standard compared to earlier judgments since it did not require “ex- 
ceptional circumstances” but rather relied on “the general situation” to find a 
refoulement violation by Belgium.69 In addition, the ECtHR did not – as in D 
v UK, Bensaid v UK and N v UK – only consider medical conditions to be of 
relevance but explicitly referred to the living conditions MSS had found 
himself in.70 
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The statement by the ECtHR that general living conditions can fall under 
Article 3 ECHR is particularly interesting with regard to the above discussion 
of whether the real risk requirement necessitates the applicant to be indi- 
vidually singled out.71 Although in MSS v Belgium and Greece the applicant 
was in a situation similar to that of many other asylum-seekers, this did not 
preclude the ECtHR from judging that his living conditions violated Article 
3 ECHR.72 For economic refugees, this lowers the threshold of proving a real 
risk that they, individually, are in a more severe danger to be subjected to 
inhuman or degrading treatment due to extreme poverty than everyone else 
living in the country of origin. 
Moreover, relying on its earlier judgment in Budina v Russia, the ECtHR 
held that not only state action but also inaction can lead to state respon- 
sibility.73 Again, this is especially important for economic refugees who do 
not want to be refouled to conditions of extreme poverty since, in most cases, 
extreme poverty is rather related to the inaction than to the action of a state.74 
While public authorities were responsible for MSS’s treatment in detention, 
they were only indirectly responsible for his general living conditions in 
poverty. Nevertheless, the ECtHR considered that due to the fact that the 
applicant was an asylum-seeker and thus especially vulnerable, Greece could 
be held responsible for its inaction.75 Diluting the requirement to prove direct 
state action hence provides an additional opening of Article 3 ECHR protec- 
tion for economic refugees. 
However, special attention was paid to the importance of an asylum-seeker 
status which made the applicant part of an especially vulnerable group.76 It 
remains unclear what exactly qualifies someone as vulnerable and whether 
economic refugees, who fall within the groups of undocumented migrants or 
rejected asylum-seekers rather than within the vulnerable group of asylum-
seekers, would still be considered vulnerable. 
As the initial quote of this paper already shows, MSS v Belgium and 
Greece introduced a radical change to the hitherto very hesitant and restrictive 
ECtHR approach. While MSS v Belgium and Greece clearly being the most 
outspoken case by the ECtHR in this respect so far, the antecedent cases of 
AA v Greece and SD v Greece in which the respective conditions of detention 
were found to be violations of Article 3 ECHR should be remembered as 
having provided the basis for a judgment as liberal as MSS v Belgium and 
Greece.77 Never before, however, had living conditions of extreme poverty 
been found to give rise to state responsibility under Article 3 ECHR. 
Although not easily applicable to all cases, the ECtHR’s reasoning in this 
respect is an essential step towards economic, social and cultural rights 
violation claims under Article 3 ECHR. The judgment widens the restrictive 
view of the preceding cases, such as N v UK, and seems to constitute a 
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possibility for economic refugees to claim protection from refoulement to 
situations of extreme poverty.78  
The subsequent case of Sufi and Elmi v UK dealt with two Somali nationals 
whom the UK wanted to deport back to Somalia because of their criminal 
offences and the government’s obligation “to protect the public from serious 
crime and its effects.”79 The ECtHR concluded that this deportation would 
be in violation of Article 3 ECHR.80 In its judgment, the ECtHR referred to 
the “”dire” humanitarian conditions in Somalia as creating the risk of ill-
treatment contrary to Article 3 [ECHR].”81 In so doing, the ECtHR relied 
upon the previous cases of Salah Sheekh v the Netherlands and N v UK as 
compared to MSS v Belgium and Greece and came to the conclusion that 
MSS v Belgium and Greece was the proper standard to apply.82 
The ECtHR explained its decision with the belief that the situation in 
Somalia was not only caused by the insufficient resources of the state but 
rather by the “direct and indirect actions of the parties to the conflict” which 
has caused “the breakdown of social, political and economic infrastructures.”83 
Consequently, the ECtHR reaffirmed the standard it had established in MSS 
v Belgium and Greece that in any decision on the applicability of Article 3 
ECHR, the ECtHR must take into account “an applicant’s ability to cater for 
his most basic needs, such as food, hygiene and shelter, his vulnerability to 
ill-treatment and the prospect of his situation improving within a reasonable 
time-frame.”84  
Accordingly, the ECtHR concluded that both applicants would face the 
real risk of ill-treatment due to the “dire humanitarian conditions” if returned 
and that therefore a deportation of either of the two applicants to Somalia 
would be a violation of the refoulement prohibition entailed in Article 3 
ECHR.85 It appears as if this case established additional, more liberal real 
risk standards through neglecting the previous necessity of relying on both 
the exceptional circumstances and the vulnerability of the applicant. Hence, 
Sufi and Elmi v UK suggests that MSS v Belgium and Greece has indeed 
been a turning point in the ECtHR’s application of Article 3 ECHR to cases 
of economic, social and cultural rights violations. It confirms a more liberal 
real risk standard which reasserts that poor living conditions can fall within 
the scope of inhuman or degrading treatment of Article 3 ECHR.  
The more recent case of SHH v UK, however, may lead to a different 
conclusion. The applicant SHH was of Afghan nationality and applied for 
asylum in the UK on the basis of being afraid of the Hizb-i-Islami and 
because he had been left disabled after a rocket launch.86 In SHH v UK, the 
ECtHR once again – and contrary to Sufi and Elmi v UK and MSS v Belgium 
and Greece – relied on the limited very exceptional circumstances standard 
of previous cases such as N v UK.87  
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The ECtHR argued that SHH v UK could be distinguished from MSS v 
Belgium and Greece because Afghanistan is, contrary to Greece, not a 
contracting state to the ECHR.88 In this regard, the ECtHR also recalled the 
Al-Skeini and Others v UK case and emphasized that ECHR standards cannot 
be imposed on other, non-contracting states.89 Moreover, SHH was not and 
would not be an asylum-seeker – and therefore not especially vulnerable – 
when in Afghanistan.90 With regard to the Sufi and Elmi v UK case, the 
ECtHR remarked that this more lenient approach had only been adopted 
“because of the exceptional and extreme conditions prevailing in south and 
central Somalia.”91 Accordingly, in SHH v UK the ECtHR arrived at the 
conclusion that “the applicant’s case does not disclose very exceptional 
circumstances as referred to in the applicable case-law [i.e. N v UK].”92  
Hence, SHH v UK turns away from the more liberal standard applied in 
MSS v Belgium and Greece and Sufi and Elmi v UK and returns to the strict 
application of the real risk standard of only the most exceptional circum- 
stances which denies that poor living conditions can fall within the scope of 
inhuman or degrading treatment of Article 3 ECHR.  
However, the ECtHR seems to not yet agree on one singular standard to 
apply. Also the recent Tarakhel v Switzerland case reflects this inconsistency. 
In the case, eight asylum-seekers from Afghanistan, among which six children, 
appealed to Article 3 ECHR in order to not be sent back to Italy because they 
would allegedly remain “without accommodation or [be] accommodated in 
inhuman and degrading conditions” upon return to Italy.93 The possibility to 
remain without accommodation was explicitly considered by the ECtHR and 
was found to not be unfounded.94 The ECtHR concluded that, in order to not 
violate Article 3 ECHR, Switzerland was obliged to request and receive 
official assurances from the Italian government “that the applicants would be 
taken charge of in a manner adapted to the age of the children and that the 
family would be kept together.”95 Moreover, the ECtHR held that state 
responsibility under Article 3 ECHR might be invoked for an “official 
indifference in a situation of serious deprivation.”96 In addition, the ECtHR 
established that, as a “particularly underprivileged and vulnerable “population 
group, asylum seekers require “special protection” under that provision 
[article 3].”97 Not only asylum-seekers but also children are considered to be 
extremely vulnerable by the ECtHR.98 However, individual vulnerability is 
not enough for invoking the non-refoulement principle. Rather, the ECtHR 
considers it necessary to examine “the applicant’s individual situation in the 
light of the overall situation.”99 Remarkably, the exceptional circumstances 







Based on the three pre- and three post-MSS v Belgium and Greece cases it 
can be observed that the ECtHR’s approach towards an application of Article 
3 ECHR to cases of extreme poverty is still ambiguous and no final con- 
clusion can be drawn, yet, as to which approach is most likely to become the 
dominant view.  
Contrasting the cases of Sufi and Elmi v UK and SHH v UK leaves some 
ambiguity as to which standard should apply to economic refugees relying 
on Article 3 ECHR for not being returned to a situation of extreme poverty. 
While the 2011 case of Sufi and Elmi v UK leans into the direction of MSS v 
Belgium and Greece, the 2013 case of SHH v UK once again returned to the 
stricter exceptional circumstances standard of earlier cases such as N v UK 
and even denies the indirect application of Article 3 ECHR to a non-member 
state of the Council of Europe. This ambiguous application by the ECtHR 
makes it impossible to draw a final conclusion as to which standard is the 
one that will or should be followed in the future. 
With the exception of SHH v UK, it can be concluded that since MSS v 
Belgium and Greece there has been an increasing recognition of vulnerability 
as relevant criterion to be applied in addition to, or possibly even as a sub- 
stitute for, the previously applied exceptional circumstances standard. The 
burden of proof for vulnerability seems to be lower than for the exceptional 
circumstances threshold and more attention seems to be paid to the general 
environment and situation in the country of origin instead of only to the 
individual circumstances of the applicant. While in D v UK the ECtHR held 
that it is primarily the individual situation of the applicant and not the con- 
ditions in the country of origin that is decisive, the ECtHR even explicitly 
remarked in more recent cases such as Tarakhel v Switzerland that the 
individual situation has to be viewed in light of the overall situation. It is 
clear that the concept of vulnerability has a broader scope than the previous 
exceptional circumstances standard but it remains to be seen how broad it 
can be interpreted and what its limits are with regard to so-called vulnerable 
groups other than asylum-seekers or children.  
For economic refugees fleeing extreme poverty this means that, following 
MSS v Belgium and Greece and Tarakhel v Switzerland, the most clearly 
established economic, social and cultural rights-related state obligations 
under Article 3 ECHR have been found in deportation issues of the Dublin 
system and within the Council of Europe area. As the contrast between Sufi 
and Elmi v UK and SHH v UK shows, there is little probability that similar 
violations will soon be found by the ECtHR with regard to deportations to 
countries outside of the Council of Europe area. Moreover, the ECtHR has 
hitherto only found non-refoulement violations under Article 3 ECHR in 
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relation to the right to health care and, to a more limited extent, with regard 
to the right to shelter. Whether other economic, social and cultural rights, 
such as the right to food or the right to employment, could possibly also fall 
within the scope of the non-refoulement principle seems highly unlikely but 
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